About me

I have a deep and enduring fascination for human behaviour. As a graduate of Film and Anthropology with a proficiency in Japanese, I come equipped with an array of scientific, literary and media insight ready and eager to engage in the inexhaustible possibilities of human experience; as a practicing graphic artist, I have expertise in the means to formulating a response. Above all, I love to learn. Having worked in graphic design, branding, creative direction and editorial, I am now looking for new, exciting roles that would afford me the opportunity to put theory into creative practice, learning from people through meaningful dialogues: together, actively shaping, consuming and sharing culture.

QuestionsProjectsExperienceTeam

Projects

• The Logan SymposiumIn 2014, The Logan Foundation and The Centre for Investigative Journalism brought the successful conference format event, tried and tested in the US — The Logan Symposium — for journalists, artists, activists and hackers to meet, discuss and collaborate in tackling current affairs, social issues and freedom of information. A distinct mission in building an alliance against secrecy, surveillance and censorship pervasive in the contemporary, globalised age. The event was held at and in association with the Barbican Centre in London and Goldsmiths, University of London providing not only a much needed multimedia venue, but lending an academic and cultural credence to the event and its subjects at hand which might ordinarily be dismissed by the casual citizen. Of course, to those working in the field of journalism — or indeed working as an activist or hacker — the long list of participating speakers, panellists and performers secured for the event was more than enough to secure sell-out attendance. Brokering a deals with the Guardian newspaper for media coverage and a live commentary stream was key to ensuring the event's exposure reached not only those professionals and enthusiasts in the know and in attendance, but also to spark the interest of the more casual reader and socially conscious reader.
• Centre for Investigative JournalismI currently act as a freelance Graphic Designer attached to the Centre for Investigative Journalism, completing a number of visual assignments such as posters, leaflets and videos for the purpose of raising awareness of the CIJ’s work, promoting its summer school, courses and media events and compiling educational handbooks for training journalists in investigative skills relating to new media.
• People
• The Concept of Race is RedundantThere are a plethora of ways in which we as humans categorise the world around us, and we, ourselves, do not escape from this compulsion. Of those arbitrary social constructs we formulate based on systematic anthropological evidence — biological, geographical and sociological — ‘Race’ is perhaps the most prevalent, recognisable and divisive. So too is it one of the most vague and inconsistent modes. The thing is, these categorisations too often take as fact are by no means absolute truths, or accurate representations of the compartmentalisations we attempt to form in order to make sense of ourselves. ‘Race’ is a nebulous concept. As a division of a larger whole it seems to be determined by a plethora of variables: physiology, biology, or culture, history, language or else kinship, or geography. While there is no clear absolute in these terms, typically all are held to be true in some sense — seemingly all at one — the concept of ‘race’ is usually considered intrinsic: a fundamental part of someone’s nature. Often this can be boiled down to telltale aesthetic differences such as skin colour — the most obvious form, the most contentious form. In due turn, this key differentiator was survived by those stigmatised to single out individuals on their supposed nature. Formulated upon Enlightenment doctrine (Hannaford, 1996) — beliefs of dominion from a non- participant Christian God were embraced — there was now a perceived right to inherit the Earth. In essence, ‘Race’ was born out of colonialism — the political and profitable enterprises begun in tandem with the Enlightenment. In reality it was less means of classification and clarity, than it was a mode of social order. Its purpose was to in some way dehumanise foreign, non-european peoples in the most literal sense: “racial designation typically implies inferiority” (Cohen, 1974: xiii). Eurocentric imperialism ensured the superiority complex of the White 'race'. So then, if the native peoples were inferior or ‘primitive’ it justified their conquest or subjugation: the label of ‘black’ as a distinct race enabled them to justify enslavement (Ratcliffe, 2004: 16); ‘red’ as distinct colorised race legitimised the Native American otherness and their subsequent near-obliteration and the theft of lands. Not only then, was there a right of inheritence but ‘race’ ideology allowed for a right to conquest (Hannaford, 1996: 192-195). Cynically speaking, ‘race’ as a concept has served its purpose well. Although the colonial era has now faded away, political agendas are an enduring part of society. Just as imperiaism saw previously constantly interwarring European states look relatively outwards against the non-Christian world (Lehning, 2013), it can be said further that the de-escalation and collapse of the ideological Cold War has refocussed “the older alliances between European Christian [predominantly white] peoples and their ancient antagonists, the Muslim East” (Jeffers, 1993: 172). It is certainly true that prevailing in the Western mindset, both before and heightened still in the wake of 9/11, is an overwhelming atmosphere of Islamophobia (Said, 1997). The prevalence of reportage on Middle Eastern issues and its expressive, often vitriol (Oborne, 2008) language, creates a culture of revulsion (Lulat, 2006) delineated down religious and ‘ethnic’ lines. Although the history and politics of the conflict are far more complex, the language and propaganda of ‘racialisation’, or ‘ethnicisation’, accompanying creates a “unitary identity for all Muslims” (Halliday, 1999: 893) as one that is discrete, polar and inferior (Cornell & Hartmann, 2002[2007]: 29). Such differentiation in turn is “marshalled to safeguard a supranational Europe” (Bunzi, 2005: 499) through commonality and differentiation. What is there in the taxonomy - a notoriously vague and changeable system - that says that those with black skin and those with white skin, or any other anomalous shade, is distinct. The power and profitability of imperialism notwithstanding, it is easy to see how ‘race’ as a concept caught on in the general sense. “Our understanding of race as a social construct must consider the sustained role that biology plays making race appear to be real.” (Watkins, 2012: S196). Morphological differences in populations make from a compelling, and crucially simplistic, case: seeing is believing. Pigmentation is indeed one of these: “Blue eyes and brown eyes are almost as visible as differences of skin or hair, yet eye colour is not a basis for organizing social realtions” (Verdery, 1994: 44). At the time of course the genetic intricacies of inheritance for skin and eye colour were not yet realised, eye colour popped up in variations across Europe, whilst geography and climate mandated the discrete populations of pigmentation. So then, ‘Race’ is reductive. “Race is not so much difference (because all populations and individuals are biologically/genetically different)” (Kittles & Keita, 1999: 87). Indeed fails to interpret the vast complexities of intracontiental and intercontinental gene flow: “racial models, as traditionally presented, are static” (Kittles & Keita, 1999: 87). They were taken to be divergent, a separate branch on Darwin’s tree of species entirely despite their perceived isolation. The fundamental logic was flawed. As such, “the term racial divergence fails to describe the process responsible for producing the variation that exists as a continuum in the human species” (Kittles & Keita, 1999: 89) in as much populations diverged and merged and exchanged in constant fluctuations. Such characteristics neither truly equate to enough genetic difference for taxonomic branching in reality. Morphological boundaries are the literal supposed evidence for differentiation, yet more liminal, metaphorical boundaries are often also employed to further propagate the notion of ‘racial’ distinctness. Just as It can be said city walls, the progenitor of state borders, “protected people from the real or imagined threats from outside... binding them with a common sense of identity” (Smith, 2012: 60) so too can it be said that the physical and institutional segregation of peoples facilitates especial differentiate, solidifying their ‘otherness’. Instances of this, accompanying racial classification, can be seen throughout history. It is a simple fact that the ghettoisation of Jews in Venice (Smith, 2012: 60) — and of course, later Nazi Germany — or else, the Berlin wall, South African apartheid or the period post-emancipation American racial segregation: wherein its physical walls, signage and symbolism were designed to instil a differential sense of identity, a sense of the ‘other’, which would in turn create “a wall in the mind” (Smith, 2012: 60), propagative and systematically institutionalising these disparities in the fabric of society. So, if ‘race’ is not innate, it is certainly enforceable. So then, just as Cornell & Hartmann rightly surmise race is an “assignment” (2002[2007]: 29), an imposition of a controlling or dominant force classifying and partitioning peoples as a means of classification, and social control. Nevertheless, ‘racist’ and hegemonic intentions aside, the fact remains that there are notable and largely collective aesthetic, structural and genetic differences amongst different populace. In turn these can often be said to at least roughly correlate with standardised racial groups (Cybulski, 2000: 473). It remains a fact that any skilled forensic anthropologist can, to a small margin of error, identify a person based on their skeletal remains — an underlying structure distinct from skin tissue as it is — to their attendant scientifically (and generally regarded offensive) classified races: Caucasoid, Mongoloid, Australoid and Negroid (Ratcliffe, 2004: 17). What is it about race as a concept that demands it be so expansive and codify so many people at once. Forensic anthropologists can likewise identify a plethora of genetic and culturally derived differentiators from skeletal remains. That there is a correlation between morphology and the established ‘racial’ framework, does not demonstrate their presence as fact. There are often just as many differences between peoples as there are amongst peoples of the same ‘racial’ designation (Marks, 2012: S169). The debatable findings that African populations (the hearth of that so-called ‘negroid’ race) contain more genetic diversity amongst themselves than other continental populations (Jorde, et al., 1997; Kittles & Keita, 1999), nevertheless displays the questionableness of defining the African peoples as a singular people in discrete terms. Consequently, the truth is that there remains, as ever, little agreement taxonomically where and what feature or set of parameters draw the line and demarcate a given race. There is little to say that the anomalous spectrum of skin tones is any more important than eye colour, height or arm span. As such, not only are the lines open to interpretation, but moreover manipulation: “the genetic date revealed race when they were expected to, negated races when they were expected to...” (Marks, 2012: S169). ‘Race’ is a product of intention and purpose. The biological parameters can be made to measure. The nineteenth century Physiognomists and Phrenologists went some way to attempt such in their quest to identify and equate phenotypes with attendant behavioural connotations. This ‘science’ subscribed to the enduring romance of classical Greek ideals of science and art as their basis of their origin. Deviance from this ideal, meant deviance in psychological terms Naturally, this left the non- European ‘races’ most divergent, most inferior (Staum, 1995). Phrenology became an estimation of a person and a peoples place in the world, in what Staum calls a “racial differentiation by ‘facial line’... a serial heirarchy of physical beauty and moral worth” (1995: 447). Quickly becoming popular, it was adopted by gothic and romanticists (Marshall, 2000) and arguably persists in the form of stock symbolism throughout the visual and literary arts — the casting of heroes, and villains as the most potent example, often dark and disfigured in their appearance. Indeed, it could easily be said the rudimentary physiognomy in the the wider sense, still exists in the form of such issues as precursory prejudice and racial profiling (Herman, 2004). It should be noted that Forensic Anthropological concerns are not necessarily racist, nor intentionally subscribe to ‘race’ as an actuality. In this sense, there does not seem to be an clear biological or physical alternative: “Ancestry is a biological fact but has no universal use in forensics” (Cox, Tayles & Buckley, 2006: 869), such observations more often than not are too specific at least initially, whilst more cultural and environmental manifestations are likely too unspecific or open to interpretation. In both a judicial sense, and an emic cultural sense — as in Cox, Tayles & Buckley (2006) in which Maori ceremony and spirituality demands accurate identification of their deceased — the best and most comprehensive estimate of identification is obviously necessary; there is simply no clear alternative at this time. Nevertheless, there are certain caveats to this continued utilisation of ‘racial’ identification that in some way excuses Forensic Anthropology as a science, beyond the above. As said, clear morphological differences abound — both within and without a ‘racial group’. That is what they are, physical and aesthetic. There is nothing inherently racist or propagatory to acknowledge and make use of this fact. Put simply and succinctly “racism exists because of the flawed reasoning that the biological variation so visible in humans translates into differences in abilities or behaviour” (Cox, Tayles & Buckley, 2006: 869). That is, such observances do not necessarily constitute a ‘race’ in the terms set out by Enlightenment thinkers, colonial profiteers or eugenists. In fact, they are phenotypes: a model of commonly grouped characteristics, which can and should be divorced from ‘race’ as an ideology. As Wade (2002) points out: ‘race’ is relative. That is to say, the lines and boundaries of each distinct ‘racial group’ are arbitrary and essentially emic. The US perspective might concern White American, African American (or, ‘black’) and Hispanic; (Wade, 2002: 5) Whereas, Brazilian catergorisation is more concerned with descent (that is, pre-migratory kinship origin), with identifying as being of Portugese, Spanish, Italian or Japanese descent, for example (Sansone, 2003: 211). This might be considered ‘ethnic’, as above, for its divorce from physiology and emphasis on birth. Interesting however, it is said that they do not hyphenate — that is, indicating a hybridised identity — rather preferring themselves ethnically Brazilian (Sansone, 2003: 211). Meanwhile, the ‘black’ population largely remains reticent to “indicate descent from Africa... afrodescendente” (Sansone, 2003: 205) and remains an anomalous. ‘Ethnicity’ and ‘race’ therefore have considerable overlap, especially in instances of self- identification, as questions of boundaries, geographies and absolutes. So if not pigmentation, then what? “If biologically distinct human races do exist, it seems odd that there is so little agreement on what they are” (Cornell & Hartmann, 2002[2007]: 22). ‘Ethnicity’ is a newer and more popular term that in many ways, even in ifs definition can often be said to roughly equate to race, even occasionally including the term in the the wording. Nevertheless, the language is semantically socially rather than biologically based. It employs personhood with a sense of agency — in as much as it does their interaction within state, kinship and culture. Unlike proponents of ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ is “not inherent in nature but a socially determined principal” (Verdery, 1994: 45) , which likewise makes it problematic. Importantly however, it divorces it from erroneous biology. Noticeably more suited to classifying social beings that human kind are, though this is certainly not always the case. Nevertheless, Roosen argues that ‘ethnicity’ as defined by Barth earlier in the same volume — as a product of boundaries and acculturation — should be extened so as to simultaneously “genealogical dimension” (Vermeulen & Govers [eds.], 1994: 3). This seems fair, after all any individual is derived from their parent’s gene pool and morphology and will considerable cultural capital in their presence. In this sense, the biological aspect only go so far as kinship, or clan morphology, rather than that based on ‘racial parameters’. Taken as such, it could be said that ‘ethnic’ identity is anchored to the homeland in someway both through the infancy of acculturation and genealogical kinship, whereas ‘culture’ on the whole is a hybrid of the plethora of later acculturation, appropriation, exchange and reflection. ‘Ethnic’ identity is formative and only partially innate, in a way that ‘race’ was entirely inherent and unaffected by socialisation. Seemingly, therein lies an important differentiator, and rationalisation for the redundancy of ‘race’ as a concept. In terms of sating both the biological and social aspects of anthropological classification. Unfortunately it does little for taxonomy. Kinship is all too ineffectual as a minutiae of cladisitics (Barth, 1994). Likewise, as Barth (1994) points out there are also issues with kinship in the social sense. The tableaux detailing two Pakistani immigrants to Norway, 30 years apart and the values taken from the homeland at different points in time goes some way to confute the holistic image of ‘ethnicity’ (derived from Long, 1992; recounted in Barth, 1994: 14-15). Temporality and the simple fact that the “global empirical variation in culture is continuous” (Barth 1994: 14) renders no synchronisation between the individual’s culture taken from the homeland, and received in the host country upon arrival, three decades, of social change and globalisation, apart from one another. Although the rite of passage of migration is similar, the modes by which they achieve this is a fundamentally altered experience, acculturation and indeed their formulated identity. How then can the two be classified definitively alike? The boundaries are forever transient. This in turn, calls into question the importance of kinship, almost certainly now a subordinate mode of ‘ethnic’ identity formulation, against the acculturation of nationhood. Indeed, notions of homeland and host country as home become a dilemma for second generation ‘migrants’ (in as much as they can be considered that, born in the ‘host’ country and likely holding its citizenship and nationality) (Hall, 1990). In such an instance — as an extension of Barth’s tableaux — can such an individual easily discern themselves to be either Pakistani or Norwegian, or if some hybridisation of the two in which order the hyphenation of their nation or ‘ethnic’ identity is formatted. In fact, such a criticism is a boon to ‘ethnicity’ as a viable classificatory concept. In so far as “racial models, as traditionally presented, are static” (Kittles & Keita, 1999: 87), contemporary globalisation and the increased scope of culture exchange (and therefore flux) has indeed lead to such a plethora of viable, and individualistic ‘ethnic’ identities. The investigation and assumption of any of these sociocultural identities (or others one should come into contact with), and the emphasis on any, is an example of cosmopolitanism: "a certain kind of openness and curiosity about different cultures" including their own, and that of their heritage often constituted through consumption, in which multiple identities and lifestyles are tried on for size, and then discarded..." (Brown, 2006: 134). Because these are self-assertive identifiers, they satisfy Smith & Tarallo’s (1993) prerequisites that classification not be dogmatically enforced, , again unlike ‘race’ has been. Rather: “a dynamic mode of self-consciousness, a form of self-hood reinterpreted...” (Smith & Tarallo, 1993: 61). But, if ‘ethnicities’ are so idiosyncratic how can they even be said to exist in the sense they typify personhood and not collectivity in any form. Likewise, the apparent transience and habitual impermanence of ‘ethnicity’, whilst speaking to notions of postmodernity, somewhat invalidates their usefulness as classificatory data in the quantitate sense. Wholesome though it seems, on the other hand, ‘ethnicity’ has a certain flavour to it that, like ‘race’, implies foreignness. One never refers to one’s own countrymen or culture as ‘ethnic’ after all. The concept seems reserved for the external. If we are to consider the canon of Anthropology, it is not had to see “it is convenient to replace the language of tribe with the language of ethnicity” (Charsley, 1974: 338). The former is of course a now regrettable commonality amongst earlier Anthropological literature, with connotations of primitiveness against the more ‘modern’ social organisation. The exoticism of ‘ethnicity’ as a bundle foreign beliefs, ceremonies and customs under scrutiny like that of ‘tribes’ and ‘races’ similarly instils ‘otherness’... Moreover, moniker of ‘ethnicity’ is not only reserved for the external, but indeed instances in which the external becomes internal: the differences between two cultures are “considered within their own respective countries, are national not ethnic... But when groups of... immigrants interact in a foreign land... they can then be referred to as ethnic groups” (Cohen, 1974: xi). In essence, it is in social contexts demanding separation and distinction that the become vehicular to the use of ‘ethnicity’, just as ‘race’ before it was a question of differentiating ‘them’ and ‘us’ (Cornell & Hartmann, 2002[2007]: 30). 1 1 Note the phrasing of ‘ethnic foods’ on high streets and supermarkets to indicate foreign cuisines, ‘ethnic practices’ to describe quirks out of the norm, ‘ethnic origin’ to define birthplace in far off regions, and the political terminology ‘ethnic minority’ as a catch-all term for predominantly foreign groups within a conscious majority culture. In summation of Cohens (1974) one might also illume that one almost certainly never considers their ‘ethnicity’ until asked, whilst one always holds a nationality. ‘Ethnicity’, then, seems an inferior measurement of differentiation given the relativeness of its application. Unfortunately, nationality comes with its own set of problems. In so far as it is immutably evident, the right of which is enshrined in international covenant (Article 15, Universal Declaration of Human Rights), it is by no means absolute or permanent. Nationality can change through migration, marriage, asylum, succession of a state or any number of political reasons. Nationality is locked to boundaries, but those boundaries though constitutional and sometimes physical they are in fact more a social construct (Smith, 2012), than the indicators of either ‘race’ (morphology, biology) and ‘ethnicity’ (culture, origin, kinship). Moreover, international borders are not impermeable, they neither corral culture and much less adhere to it. The boundaries and extensions of culture (and therefore ‘ethnicity’) overlap, leading to another plethora of immeasurable hybridisations. While there are clearly a number of negatives to the concept of ‘race’, it is not without its positives. Just as ‘race’ was intended to underline difference, so too can it be said to emphasise similarities within a given ‘racial group’. “Black power... making black race a positive sign” (Painter, 2000:378) was only possible though the unity of collectivism and the recognition of similarity. As a result, segregation and the American colour coded caste system conversely — eventually — failed in part because the very act of racialisation and segregation caused a spacialisation of a group of people: “representational spaces are the spaces of resistance and protest” (219). Their ‘race’ gave them a platform and vocal body of people upon which to advocate themselves as a socially relevant whole. Subjugatory ideology can be appropriated for other means: in this case, egalitarianism. This trend does not cease with enfranchisement. Just as racism remains an issue, so too does the counterforce. Jeffers’ (1993) examination of the British Parliamentary Black Caucus (Jeffers, 1993: 174-176) raises the issue once more of collectivism by race or ethnic group — this can be extended further to consider the Congressional Black Caucus, Hispanic Congressional Caucus and Hispanic Congressional Caucus, of the United States — in a more contemporary political climate. Superficially, such partitioning of politicians seems counter-intuitive, with the singling out of the “black perspective” (Jeffers, 1993: 175) inadvertently serving only to differentiate it from the nonracial human condition on the whole. Nevertheless, it remains true that there are only two elected US African American Senators as of the 113th Congress (one of which is a member for the Caucus) and 43 African American members of congress in totality; 37 Hispanic, 13 Asian/Pacific Islander and a mere 2 ‘American Indian’ [as the language of the Congressional Research Profile dictates] members of Congress (Manning, 2014: 8-9). Meanwhile, only 27 (of 650) members of Parliament hail from UK mandated ethnic minorities as of 2014. The ‘black perspective’ then, or rather that of a minority group, is one of under-representation. Cornell & Hartmann (2002[2007]) likewise assert the Inuit collective moniker as organised groups of otherwise separate peoples (across Alaska and Canada) come together to “assert their own commonality, rooted in history, culture, and kinship, transcending national borders” (31). Again, here, ‘ethnicity’ is self assigned, and a means of not only demarcation, but compare. Empowerment through exchange, numbers and visibility. On the other hand, it can be easily seen in many ways the Inuit (for all the complexities and confusion in name) have become a vague and unspecific amalgam — a perception of homogeneity belies the truth, because of ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ classification. Besides, could it not be said that such positive applications are merely the effectual response of all the implications bestowed on society by ‘race’ in the first place? The concept becomes damning superfluous, even dangerous, instantly. We have already seen how the rise Islamaphobia can fortify geopolitical conflict. ‘Race relations’, such might be called, as if ‘races’ inherently need to reconcile(!) Antiracism too, surely the natural contravention of ‘racial’ ramifications, paradoxically seems to solidify the concept as factual. The continued popularity and usage of the concept of ‘race’ or the more delineating connotations of ‘ethnicity’, despite being largely discredited by the arguments above, also lies at the feet of media and communications: “it is easier for a journalist or a photographer to sell a story that takes ethnicity as its subject than one that addresses social differences” (Sansone, 2003: 5). One only has to look at headlines of national and international newspapers to see its prevalence. Recent news has indeed been dominated by the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri amongst other instances across the country (Crilly, 2014; Blow, 2014). And whilst it may or not be an issue of ‘race’ (indeed, aforementioned racial profile exists) the incredible media reticence in disseminating crucial misinformation — that ‘race’ is an actuality, and not mythology — reinforces that same historical ‘us’ and ‘them’ narrative (Cornell & Hartmann, 2002[2007]: 30) of ‘race’ into the postmodern worldscape. The cycle thus prevails. The subtle difference remains: the former is a response to a social phenomenon based on shared experience as a result of historical misinformation; the latter inadvertently broadcasts that ‘race’ exists, by emphasising the immorality of discriminating against it. Verdery (1994) argues that ‘ethnicity’, like ‘race’ before it, has often been seen as a mode of homogenisation emphasising similarity rather than difference. The effects of nationhood — politics and policy enforce “notions of ‘commonality’” (Verdery, 1994: 45) — and collective living formulates boundaries of likeness. In fact, the emphasis should be on difference, because it is these instances in a globalised world that most starkly delineate one person, and their ‘ethnic’ identity, from the next. “It does not partition neatly into separable, integrated wholes” (Barth 1994: 14) makes it impossible to catergorise or compartmentalise peoples into distinct and representative groups effectively: whether the supposed boundaries are geographical, temporal since absolutes simply do not exist, or at least subsist in any manner. There is then a sense of a patchwork, and not a melting pot, in human taxonomy: heterogeniety, not homogeniety. ‘Race’ is an ideology. No matter the logic or science disputing ‘race’ as reality, as long it is believed and holds sway it remains — if not the truth — a de facto system of classification of the human species. Taken as fact, it can be (and proves to be) immensely effectual to the interpersonal and political landscape of society. Thought and policy are entwined with the ideology: reflexively and responsively. It is clear that the history of thought behind the ideology gives it weight, while its largely aesthetic, physical manifestation aids its propagation through relative simplicity. ‘Race’ is functional and effective. No matter the intention — good or ill — that much is certain. Less than desirable though it is for clarity, and human unity, it serves to highlight and progress a plethora of ingrained social inequalities. Which, in turn, are conversely predominantly the consequence of ‘race’ and its conception in the first place. Its ramifications are widespread and can not easily be excised from the equation; in many ways both ‘Race’ and its nearest replacement, ‘ethnicity’, work only as an aesthetic and socio-historical shorthand, more akin to sociology than biology. They are ways of reading evidence, not fundamental truths. There seems to be no entirely viable replacement that, like ‘race’, truly satisfies both a biological framework nor the fundamental paradox that humans are the same, yet exhaustively different. Until ‘race’ as a classificatory notion can be supplanted in the public consciousness (at least in majority terms) by another more compelling ideology or concept of classification, it can never truly be redundant. Misleading, it is at the same time undesirable and superfluous. ‘Ethnicity’ seems the most considered replacement. Though it goes some lengths to clarify the more cultural, social and national basis of classification in its definition, it is all too often used synonymously. ‘Nationality’ is simply too specific and unforgiving in the contemporary globalised world; ‘culture’ is too vague, and too fluid in its presentation for the taxonomic classification. Borders then, literal and imagined, are at the heart of ‘racial’, ‘ethnic’, cultural and national classificatory terms. They belie each in turn as social constructs, in which none are quite right, and all are somewhat misleading. What is certain, is that ‘race’ is fallacious, regrettable and far from its denouement.
• INEQUALITIES INHERENT WITHIN THE MIGRATION PROCESS AND THE ROLE OF THE CITY IN SHAPING THE MIGRATION EXPERIENCE.The migratory process is one that has defined the human species in its proliferation and settlement of the furthest reaches of the globe. Likewise, our sociality and interconnectivity have become vehicles for our education, creativity and production. Throughout history, however notions of civilisation have gradually organised the human species into larger and yet increasingly more regulated and defined social arrangements. The settlement of towns and cities, and the advent of nationhood has progressively restricted and curtailed the movements of its subjects and citizens both through physical fortification and cultural rhetoric. Nevertheless, the Freedom of Movement for all humans, is enshrined within the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 13. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) As nation-states reserve the right of ingress for external migrants as a matter of their discretion, selective procedure is employed with the view to protect and benefit the receptive state. A common criterion for the selection of viable migrants is that of perceived skill-level. The differentiation between exactly what constitutes ‘high’ and ‘low’ skill levels and their occupational counterparts is open for debate. General consensus however, designates it as quantified Human Capital, such as in Iredale (2000), based on one’s years, level and grade of formal education. Nations typically favour such ‘high-skilled’ migrants on the perception that their education willlikely make more of a contribution to society (Price and Benton-Short, 2007: 105) and that they will have the tendency to actively participate in, rather than stagnate, the state. Thus legitimising the movement and migration of a skilled elite. That said, because the relative definitions of ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ vary across nations and culture, each holding different values and dispositions – both internally and comparatively externally — “what is recognised as 'skilled' relative to 'unskilled ' in one context… may not be so in another” (Findlay and Gould, 1989: 6), the whole process is arbitrary at best, with no discernible absolute. This can lead to the phenomenon of the ‘deskilling’ of migrants, who end up working jobs that they are overqualified for, despite ostensibly being ‘highly-skilled’. Examples of this can be seen in (Iredale, 2000: 885). Critiquing of the terminology, one step further, Florida (2007) establishes that “foreign workers” no matter their skill level may bring different modes of creativity and “provide valuable services not available” to native workers (Florida, 2007: 39). He bases this notion on the premise that creativity is an “intrinsically human ability” (Florida, 2007: 38). This it is far from a complete picture of potential: it “overlook[s] extraordinary contributors made by entrepreneurs and cultural creatives who have not completed college” (Florida, 2007: 32). Thus it might be more pertinent to establish the notion of Creative Capital, not linked to the years of one’s learning, but the ability and willingness to learn. The assumption that migration to a economically affluent country or city will result in increased profit is a common motivator. Jane Wills (2007) shows the flaw in this assumption, regarding a migrant worker from Nigeria: “at home… professional job in human resources, earning £150 a month;” now “working as a cleaner… the London Underground… earning £600.” (Wills, 2007: 130) However, whilst a migrant might nominally be able to earn more — even in such ‘deskilled’ roles — the difference is likely largely diminished by the increased cost of living in a global urban locations: as in the case study, where £300 is spent on rent alone, and money is also sent home to her family (Wills, 2007: 130). Moreover, migrant’s social life, sleep and their overall standard of living are often “'sacrificed' on the altar of wages” (Wills, 2007: 128), in order to justify the migration in terms of profitability. The fact that money was largely sent home to family as a stipend, and occasionally sent back in times of economic downturn (Wills, 2007: 128), absolutely ties the migrants to their homeland — in an inescapable mutual relationship of reliance. Cities, in focus, offer potent examples that migration is not exclusively an international phenomenon. Sharon Zukin (1996) describes the positive effect of both internal migrants and immigrants, on cities in terms of their accumulation of cultural capital, which in turn ensures the renewal of stock in attracting a steady flow of further migrant labour to the city. She concludes that “if New York loses the dynamism of culture capital, the industry risks losing a labor supply of artists, actors, and other creative[s]… who migrate to New York from other parts of the country and the rest of the world” (Zukin, 1996: 186). These, typically considered, ‘unskilled’ or ‘semi-skilled’ migrants demonstrate how they positively provide the city with crucial labour, as well as a palpable and promotional identity. Likewise, Katherine Hampstead’s (2003) ethnographic study of New York City considers the dual importance of native and external migratory behaviour, in enforcing duality that perpetuates the migratory attraction to the location, that defines it. As a result of this mixture of multiculturalism and native artistry, world cities, like New York, become “cauldrons of creativity” (Florida, 2007: 159), regardless of skill-level. Elements of Zukin’s (1996) work goes on to detail the disparity between native migrants and external immigrants and their attendant position in the hierarchy of jobs — in this case: “front” and “back” workers, in the restaurant trade (Zukin, 1995: 153-185). Providing qualitative evidence that whilst skill level is a considered predominant determiner of migratory value, so too can: ethnicity. Foremost is the prevalence of “native” labourers in the “front” section of the service and “ethnic” migrants in the “back”, that is largely hidden, out of sight from the clientele. However, certain nationalities are assumed to hold — on the basis of social capital established by the migratory chain (Hannerz, 1980: 267) — increased acceptability and legitimacy as workers, and therefore migrants: “‘Egyptian waiters… They have class. They’re great waiters. They have great table manners. They’re all that way.’” (Zukin, 1995: 174) while, “Bangladeshi immigrants, like Mexicans, lack English-skills, ‘urbane’ manners and the European or culturally ‘white’ appearance.” (Zukin, 1995: 173) This establishes that, while there is mention of certain skills owned by the individual, they are largely attributed specifically to the context of their nationality, ergo skill-level is not alone in determining migratory potential. Furthermore, together, this demonstrates the necessity for such a worker — multicultural, semi-skilled (such as artists, and those waiters with foreign degrees) — as an important functionary in the sustenance of the city. It is suggested that the export of low-skilled migrants is particularly beneficial to source countries (Hugo, 1995: 296), not only in removing a saturation of the unemployed, but moreover in terms of return migration, whereby skills and cultural capital are acquired during migration and of the benefit of the source state: (Dustmann, Bentolila and Faini, 1996). This in turn alleviates the risk of a ‘brain drain’ on the source nation in the long run, and, in fact can be said to constitute a brain-gain (Hugo, 1995: 296). This hypothesis holds so long as return migration is deemed attractive, as this acquisition of skills may actually be detrimental to prospective employment back in the country of origin, do to over-qualification (Laczko, 2002: 606), not to mention the prospect of lower wages — the likely cause of emigration in the first place. Conversely, the host state can be seen to benefit from the immigration and non-return of ‘low-skilled’ immigrants in the long run. It is evidenced that such settled migrants follow a trend of investing in the second generation’s education “low-skill immigrants frequently turn into high-skill immigrants as first-generation American parents invest in their children’s education” (Florida, 2007: 84). Thus the admission of low-skilled immigrants can be doubly beneficial to a host state in providing immediate relief to unemployment and the delayed gratification of the future innovation systematically associated with the contribution of highly skilled (Florida, 2007: 84). Thus it is possible for ‘low-skilled’ migrants to find a place both within and without their homeland. Prejudice is often rife towards immigrants and temporary migrants. Justification for public opinion can be found in Florida’s (2007) examples, where nationhood and nationalism rises at times of turmoil: civil wars, world wars and terrorism (Florida, 2007: 70). One might add to this: economic downturn, as seen in “only when economies in the employing countries deteriorate considerably… especially when unemployment here has become rampant” (Marx, 1986: 18), in which jobs become scarce, and thus ‘natives’ are forced to compete with migrants for any available jobs. Recent data collected and published by YouGov for the Sunday Times, demonstrates the negativity of UK public opinion on immigration: with 63% responding agree that a maintenance or increase of ‘people with high education, skills and looking for work’ in the UK, in contrast to a 13% for ‘people with low education, skills and looking for work’ (YouGov, 2013). Although, current sentiment is unfavourable towards immigration in general, there is a noticeably stark difference between the two figures. Ergo, the well-educated and ‘highly skilled’ are largely (although far from completely) allowed to circumnavigate the external otherness of their nationality and immigrant status. Whether seen as cause or effect, respectively, both public opinion and government policy and its propaganda do little to demonstrate the actual truth. For example, recent statements made by the current government in the UK (Wintour, 2013) — and since joined by policy put forward by France and Germany (Mason, 2013) — is the intention to curb so-called ‘benefit-tourism’: migrants and immigrants who arrive in a country and reap the rewards of social welfare, without contributing. The intention to limit the social welfare benefits of new immigrants to the country, in the hope that fewer come. This discourse, while not exclusive to, is in relation to ht European Union’s Right to Free Movement of Workers, and the 7 year deadline of limitations on the rights of citizens of recently ascended EU states, in this case Bulgaria and Romania (Wintour, November 2013). However, it can easily pointed out that it is in fact “the obligation of the new migrant's native country to pay unemployment benefit” (Perkins, 2013), in terms and relevance here to the European Union. This plain sight truth often, laughably, misconstrued by rhetoric. Regardless of this overlooked detail, the fact remains that migrants and permanent immigrants in particular are not actually international brigands who live off the welfare state. In fact, all evidence does indeed contrast public opinion: “Evidence from the EU, says there is no correlation between levels of unemployment benefit and immigration” (Wintour, March 2013). So they are, in fact, by definition: migrant workers. However, this admission far from clears up the issue. One of the most popular and falsely perpetuated notions is the cliché of immigrants taking jobs away from the native populous, as in the “anti-immigrant alliance composed largely of the right-wing… and the tabloid press.” (Zincone, Pennix and Borkert, 2011: 49) such as, sensationalist headlines of: “Immigration to Britain is greater than at any time in history. We must cut their numbers NOW” (Daily Mail, 2012). That said, the saturation of the labour market is rarely a complete untruth, and indeed immigrants do of course — as said — take jobs. The fact is, migrants galvanise — through social capital and migratory chains — typically to fill gaps in the labour market. Nonetheless, discourse at times of economic hardship, as aforementioned by government and the commentary media propagate the fallacy: “The British government has been accused of pandering to prejudice” (Wintour, March 2013), thus there is a reluctance to accommodate low-skilled migrants in particular, who are seen more and more as a burden on the state. Moreover, it is evidence of the state’s ability to scapegoat a demographic with the intention of patching up its failures. And typically are more willing to work jobs that are either too under-waged, for the overeducated populous or those that follow the “dirty, difficult, dangerous" principle (Hugo, 1995: 294), and are deemed undesirable for a native worker. In fact, moreover, immigrants taking these jobs — which already enhances much needed production, especially if an economy is flagging — actually helps create new jobs, and new markets: (Muller, 1994 :143). Thus, increased migration can be doubly beneficial for a host state, particularly ‘low-skilled’ migrants who are unlikely to reject the described undesirable jobs out of haughtiness, and accept them out of necessity. In particular, the filling of niches with labour markets can be achieved by the process of Circular Migration, by which migratory individuals divide their time between two or more locales. This type of migrant seeks to utilise seasonal availability of work and the aforementioned vacancy of many low-skilled labour jobs. Often this takes the form of agricultural work in richer countries (Florida, 2007; Hugo, 1995; Triandafyllidou, 2013), and returning to their country of origin at the season’s end. Other occupations might include street-peddling or work in the service industry made busy by tourism (Triandafyllidou, 2013: 223), another aspect of globalisation. However, despite transitory nature, this category of migrant often codifies a ‘home’ locale, supporting their — like many others — a family with the income earned in foreign regions. (Triandafyllidou, 2013) Thus the individual is tethered to a home country, or base, from which they cyclically migrate: always returning. As a practice it is indeed most common amongst “low or semi-skilled” migrants, whose skill-set is often best utilised on a seasonal basis — whether through agriculture, industry or tourism — and whose work is transitory, and replaceable. The main beneficiary however, can be said to be the host states themselves: “circularity clearly fills a labour market niche without raising the challenges of long-term migrant integration” (Triandafyllidou, 2013: 218-219). This kind of migrant comes readymade, in the sense that the host state need not spend on education or social welfare — and yet benefit from their labour and taxation. Countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece recognise these Functionalist merits in employing a steady stream of this type of worker, fostering international migratory programmes, policy and marketing with partner, source countries such as Morocco and Albania (Triandafyllidou, 2013). Unfortunately for the migrant, being of such a transitory nature, this process leaves them in, at worst, a kind of de facto statelessness. Dependent on reintegration policies, a circular migrant may not be afforded the same level of state benefits in their homeland — such as pension schemes or medical insurance, for example — and are unlikely to actively participation in domestic national politics (Triandafyllidou, 2013: 217). Thus despite being tied by kinship to their homeland and accumulating economic and human capital, a circular migrant is not afforded the full state welfare benefits. Beyond the income sent home and any savings, individuals are unlikely to have a pension in any country set up, or any property. Urbanisation can be seen as an instrumental driving force behind the creation and sustenance of nationhood. National borders can be seen as an extension of city fortification of antiquity: “protected populations against real and imagined threats from outside… united the enclosed community, binding them with a common sense of identity and shared purpose.” (Smith, 2012: 60) A description synonymous between the two boundaries, both metaphorically and physically. Borders, then, by extension are not just designations of territory and collectivity, but also barriers against the outside world: the other. Nigel Harris (2003) elaborates that “borders become brutalised, militarised, and criminalised in order to intimidate any who propose to enter” (Harris, 2003: 4466) This is a modernisation of Smith’s assertion that city “walls also created fertile ground in which seeds of suspicion and even paranoia could grow.” (Smith, 2012: 61) Likewise, combined with borders, governmental policy — as aforementioned — “seems almost deliberately designed to provoke the greatest xenophobia” (Harris, 2003: 4470), in its constant crusade to paint immigrants as illegal and freeloading. In fact, importantly, mention is made of low-skilled migrants too: “fortified borders represent a permanent war against… attempt to meet the demand for low skilled workers - with the same discouraging results…” (Harris, 2003: 4466). So then, cities — seats of political and economic power — become a microcosm for the fortified nation that discourages and alienates immigrants. The global epidemic that is Human Trafficking (Clinton and Cdebaba, 2011; Lapham’s Quarterly, 2009) can be divided into two distinct categories: Smuggling and Abduction. For the purposes of migration only the former applies, in that it is largely the willing attempt of migrants, and refugees, to cross borders illegally — rather than being forced to do so. A huge criticism of the generalised biased policy towards ‘high-skilled’ migrants over ‘low-skilled’ migrants is that “the demand for unskilled workers in agricultural, construction, industry and services is also high, but many states fail to recognize [sic] this, so that workers have to move through illegal channels” (Castles, 2004: 211). Thus the exclusionary haughtiness of receptive states and their policies created ostensibly to curb torrents immigration has something of an inverse, unwarranted effect. Furthermore, this problem has been given thrust by the fact that immigration, and its control and limitation, has become so ingrained in political discourse. As a burgeoning of public opinion: “managing the contradiction that Japan [for example] desperately needs unskilled workers, while public opinion will not accept a labour recruitment policy” (Castles, 2004: 215). In effect, an inescapable loop is created, that actually forces states to spend more of its annual budget on policing its borders and investigating trafficking rings. Ergo, overregulation of skill-based migratory behaviour, biased against the typically more desperate ‘low-skilled’ migrants creates a far more serious, illegal and potentially expensive problem. Another result of public discourse and misconstrued law is that, of course, trafficked individuals are reluctant to report their situation, not just in fear of their traffickers, but also from reprisals of the host state: “they find themselves treated as criminals by… authorities” (Lakhani, 2007). Not only does this leave the extent of the issue relatively unreported, moreover it allows for the cycle to go largely unnoticed. That is not to say that the problem is unpreventable. Beyond the costliness of increasing policing and federal investigation of this black market, there is also a consensus that “smuggling and trafficking… irregular migration in general, could be reduced if there were more regular migration channels open” (Laczko, 2002: 599). Such channels, and organised integration procedures — such as the setting up of NGOs as seen in Japan, a documented beneficiary of unskilled immigration (Selleck, 2001) and hotspot human traffic destination (Clinton and Cdebaba, 2011) — would be relatively cost-effective in so much as passing any regulation or law is. It could likely also better facilitate circular migration, and its inherent benefits, both aforementioned social and economic, over permanent immigration. Consequently, it may seem like a conundrum that states, particularly those seen to be suffering from an ageing and over-educated population, not to better provision circular migration and its adherent advantages, to both state and individual. Moreover, simply and ethically, to curb the exploitation and abuse of persons through the global Trafficking epidemic (Clinton and Cdebaba, 2011). However, “policies that claim to exclude undocumented workers may often really be about allowing them in through side doors and back doors, so that they can be more readily exploited” (Castles, 2004: 223). So it seems that governments often institute restrictions on migratory behaviour not so much to curtail the phenomenon but drive it in a particular, more profitable, direction. Of course the illegality of trafficked immigrants and unauthorised aliens allows for increased production through the filling of vacant occupations, lower and unregulated wages thereafter and no access to any form of welfare in the interim; as a result the state wins out in all areas, notwithstanding, the expense of policing. Although, all evidence points to being this being a fairly overlooked and unsuccessful pursuit (Dugan, 2011). Since the majority of smuggled migrants are those belonging to the ‘low-skilled’ cohort there is the suggestion that — whilst migration remains ostensibly for the ‘high-skilled’, in legitimacy — such policies are designed to facilitate the migration, supply and exploitation of a suppress, cheap ‘low-skilled’ labour underclass. Likewise, through enforcement of controlled borders, it can be argued that the states are not so much hindering immigration proper but rather circular, transitory migration. Because the cost and risk of cross militarised international borders is so great, migrants set to mind are increasingly likely to cross the border oneway, rather than attempt to return home or remain transient. It is this act of “locking in… undocumented aliens” (Scharf, 2006: 159) that Wonders (2007) notes as “ensuring the stability of a cheap labor force and the continued exploitation of economic migrants” (Wonders, 2007: 42) Facilitating this, then, allows for a combination of benefits to both state and employer. Not only is gross production increased as illegal immigrants fill the most undesirable and vacant jobs, but allows them at a far cheaper rate; since unauthorised person have no constitutional rights in the host country, they are not entitled to either labour rights such as minimum wage or adequate provisions for health and safety, or social security and likely healthcare. Just as borders seem almost intentionally designed to prevent immigrants from leaving in as much as they are to prevent it in the first place, it also helps perpetuate the growing problem of brain drain; augmented by the fact both high-skilled, and low-skilled with newly acquired social and human capital, cannot return home: “very high rates of medical brain drain for a number of small developing countries” (Ivlevs and De Melo, 2010: 112). As a result, a primarily effected country, the UK’s “National Health Service, which devotes a high percentage of its funding to providing healthcare for the elderly, has already begun to recruit nurses from abroad and relies heavily on foreign doctors.” (Laczko, 2002: 604). Nevertheless, where the benefits of such immigration is patent for the importing state, as with any occupational group, the exportation of migrant doctors has implications for the source country. John Connell’s (2007) ethnographic study of migrant health workers exported from the Caribbean and Pacific illuminates an example of this issue. “represent classic examples of the brain or skill drain” (68). However, so long as this practice is not too extensive and does not deplete the stock of any group of labourers, “developing economy a brain drain of skilled labour may raise the welfare of the economy while an emigration of unskilled labour may be welfare reducing”. (Chaudhuri, 2004: 730) It is as if ‘low’ or ‘unskilled’ labour plays a fundamental role in society, something that seems unthinkable in political rhetoric. Thos demonstrability of its own kind of ‘brain drain’ of sorts, a stagnation in production, solidifies the importance of the ‘low-skilled’ migrant in the global market. Therefore, in totality considering that a careful balance of different levels of worker, and indeed migrants of different backgrounds and origins — domestic and international — must be found: “a more liberal trade regime with internationally immobile capital will result in a labour force with a more favourable skill mix” (López and Schiff, 1998: 335). Considering the evidence it is clear that the international labour market absolutely needs the migration of low-skilled labour, in as much as it does high-skilled labour. The exportation and importation of each is at different times a necessity and a burden, in different locations. The maintenance, globally, therefore requires not only the cooperation of a multitude of nations — all nations — but moreover a rejection of the bias towards human capital as the only means of judging value. Skilled workers, of all grades, therefore demonstratively valuable each in their own way, are a necessity: “Diversity is not merely enjoyable; it is essential” (Florida, 2007: 35), and their absence: to the detriment.
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  GLOBALISED HYBRID IDENTITY DO THE GLOBAL FLOWS OF IDEAS, COMMODITIES AND TECHNOLOGIES PRODUCE HOMOGENISATION, OR DO THEY ENCOURAGE A PROLIFERATION OF SUBCULTURES AND COSMOPOLITAN IDENTITIES?The contemporary era is a globalised one. The interconnectivity of peoples, cultures and nations abounds, with the global exchange of ideas, commodities and technologies at an unprecedented level and scope. However, growing concern amongst critics of globalisation is the attendant possibility, and supposed certainty, of its expedition of homogenisation. It is the global interconnectivity of the internet age above all in which homogenisation seems to be occurring “without precedent in human history, at least for the scope, speed and manner in which changes are taking place” (Pollock, 2002: 15). Its proliferation into the commonplace daily routine of human life, particularly in the northern hemisphere, has allowed globalisation to occur at a rapid pace. And yet, this is hardly the only instance of globalisation in history. Bisley (2007) establishes many antecedent instances, such as Roman Empire, Mongol Empire, European Colonial Age, summarily globalised the world through conquest and imperial expansionism. So too did the advent of free trade and tractate amongst fellow imperial powers. Perhaps then, the postcolonial world is one that has yet to adapt to just that: post-colonial thought. Many of the current paradigms for globalisation are based on the basic assumption of cultural usurpation: where colonisation, invasion and wars of religion and ideology effectively lead to the victorious side spreading and enforcing “his superiority and that of the ‘civilization’ he imposed upon the colonized” (Cohen, 2007: 43), which is surely the more absolutist manifestation of homogenisation than can be seen today. Despite supposed near ubiquity, the internet can equally be said to proliferate disparities of thought: “the sociophere is far more extensive than we realize” (Govier, 1997: 227). The unprecedented interconnectivity of the world, is not reflective of two parties meeting on the shore, field of battle or court of previous ages, but rather a multilateral discourse between participants abounding. After all, despite discourse, Americanisation is not the only demonstrable cultural diffusion, although it is frequently the most criticised: “once Americanisation is relativized, Japanization or Russianization… can be apprehended and analyzed as integral parts of a fundamentally nonobjective and fractal world” (Ching, 2001: 295). Accelerated still, the disparity of these participants ensures a maelstrom of multilateral discourse (Holton, 2005: 55; Cohen, 2007: 23). h This pervasion of commonplace routine by any concept or object is often a watermark for homogenisation: “there is no denying the fact that certain styles, brands, tastes and practices now have global currency and can be encountered virtually anywhere in the world” (Tomlinson, 1999: 83). Importantly however, this is a superficial homogenisation: disregarding that commodities need not necessarily carry the same value or mythology in all cultures. For example, a global brand amongst the typical culprits of Americanisation — the fast food outlet KFC — is treated rather differently in Japan than its homeland. Where it was designed merely as convenient and enjoyable for mass consumption in the United States, in Japan it has acquired additional ritualisations: being the modern meal for the commercialised, secular Japanese Christmas celebration (Whipp, 2010; Smith, 2012); it is an approximation of a singled out Western perspective, filtered through the Japanese fascination with the West and their own cultural traditions of gift giving at the nearby New Year celebration (Hendry, 1995). The conception and proliferation of stereotypical iconography and motifs is one of appropriation (Anheier & Isar, 2010). Likewise, Coca-cola, another brand from the United States becomes localised in its material culture in the Caribbean (Miller, 1998): glocalisation. Here, it represents a local bottling livelihood rather than the iconography of capitalist American prosperity. Therefore, whilst global presence ostensibly gives the appearance of homogenisation across cultures, it disregards the emic perspective of the “pluralistic, distinct, and disjunct disunities of cultural formations” (Ching, 2001: 295), on which all things are valued and defined. Urbanisation is a phenomenon of particular note. As hubs of international trade, immigration and cultural exchange, the city has superseded the nation-state in terms of global importance: “Globalization has not obliterated geography, but it has created new hierarchies in which cities are key centres, operating horizontally across space, as much as vertically within nation-states” (Holton, 2005: 61). Indeed, the city has with countries being viewed in economic, political and media discourse in synecdoche: London for United Kingdom, New York and Washington for USA, Tokyo for Japan. Moreover, it can be said that such cities share more in common with one another than they do with their domestic counterparts (Beckel, 2001: 18). They share the same regulated global financial systems, act as platforms for the same world events, they offer the same commodities which in turn are consumed by similar demographically split denizens. Thus, there is an internal heterogeneity within the nation-state at least, even if the global city’s newfound cosmopolitanism can be accused of relative ubiquity (Bisley, 2007:163) as a result of those global brands and commodities. The city as a migratory site, an epicentre for cosmopolitanism through infrastructure and migration (Holton, 2005: 60-61), avails construction of this supposed ubiquity. Indeed, this multicultural infusion alters the fabric of the urban landscape with multitudes of new and disparate styles and peoples. In turn this command of cultural capital formulates a self-replenishing allure of cosmopolitanism (Zukin, 1995). A proliferation ensues, both on influx and interaction, with enclaves of peoples that gradually develop into hybridised “multiple identities and lifestyles” (Brown, 2006: 134). The assimilation of peoples could be said to be factor of homogenisation. But, can a migrant be said to wholly discard their antecedent formative cultural identity; do they forget their mother tongue or avail themselves of their deep rooted mores, even if they adapt their religion, ideology or lifestyle? Formulation of global cities through immigration not only becomes a synecdoche for the nation it represents, but also the multicultural world assembled in patchwork microcosm. Conversely, the Japanese Sakoku isolation policy of the 18th and 19th century: a measure adopted to combat the suffusion of Christianity on the Japanese archipelago, from the Iberian culture (Hogan, 2011: 40): an active attempt at ensuring stability and cross-continental cultural heterogeneity. During the period, however, Japan can be said to have suffered in terms of “political and social development… arrested by obsessive internal controls” (Millard, 2001: 12), in comparison to the rapidly globalising world in the the Age of Discovery (Bisley, 2007). Exceptions prove this rule, as it can be noted that through Dutch merchants (the sole allowable international trading partner, limited to a single port in Nagasaki): “the fascination with perspective, and later with shadows and other light effects, was born of the most minimal contact between Japanese artists and… European books” (Little, 1996: 76). Such works created in this time, often of foreign realms and vistas unseen as they were by Japanese eyes, were in application a mere “approximation”, “imitation”, “experiments”, “misconceptions owing to incomplete understanding” (Little, 1996: 78). Perception was filtered through enculturation, through their own cultural predispositions to what they heard and read. Comparably, although with intent, the disparate landscapes of the vast British Empire were frequently depicted in the style of the picturesque canon of British landscape painting, based not so much on the literal presentation of the foreign lands, but metaphorical representation through the aesthetic of Britishness and the homeland (Auerbach, 2004). In an effort to create an image of familiarisation and unity amongst the multinational subjects, this can clearly be taken as propaganda, and a very active attempt at homogenising the empire. Likewise, recent isolationist attitude of the North Korean Juche has recently demonstrated both the stagnation of isolation but also, an homogenisation of its internal culture: with strict regulations on the haircuts its citizens are allowed to wear (BBC, 2004). Active thought can be both a means towards and combatant against the homogenisation of culture and national identity. The foundation of a nation state and overarching national identity is far from a concrete certainty. Borders, territory and unions are fluid. Since decolonisation borders and unions have followed a continually diminutive scalar trend. “While globalization is contributing to a cosmopolitan sensibility it is equally driving a rise in nationalism…” (Bisley, 2007: 210). Even in the contemporary age examples such as the ongoing the Québec sovereignty debate (Duchesne, Eagles & Erfle, 2003), the Scottish Referendum for independence (Carrell, 2013), the Crimean succession (Harding & Walker, 2014) and the recent Venetian referendum (Molloy, 2014) calling for an independent Venetian Republic, demonstrate that there is dual trend (alongside the aforementioned global city) towards increased microscopical identification and cultural differentiation. Rather than homogenisation, their conception of political and cultural identity is ever more specific. Of homogenisation through globalisation, “language loss is one aspect” (Pollock, 2002: 15). Differentiation can occur within a nation perhaps by the survival of a regional language or dialect: Welsh in Wales, Neapolitan in Campania and Southern Italy and Catalan in Catalonia, which has been suggested as a major proponent for the conservation of the distinct Catalonian identity (Brandes, 1990: 24). Which, it should be noted continues to be considered the native language by around 40% of the Catalonian population despite the Spanish language being “imposed on the local population by the governing authorities in Madrid for more than two and half centuries” (Ferrer, 2000: 190). Conversely, the legislation protecting the use of Canadian French dialects in the provinces of Québec and New Brunswick (Gade, 2003) allows for the distinction of different cultural groups within the same national borders. It is clear that the is a perception that the use and regulation of language are vehicles by which cultural identity can be defined, dictated or conserved. Similarly, even as part of a collective nation or within larger overarching international institutions (such as the European Union, Arab League or United Nations), regional identities remain. One can simultaneous be both European and British, and moreover identify as Welsh or Scottish, for example; or else, Puerto Rican and American; a Londoner and yet an international migrant (Wills et al., 2010; Favell, 2011). Not only is a scalar trend towards increased subcultural differentiation — the antithesis of homogenisation — but, a multilayered hybridisation of identity. Peoples are therefore allowed to identify with each of their experiences rather than merely allegiance to the homeland: formulating multilayered, cosmopolitan subcultures. The global reach of world religions is also demonstrates a paradoxically heterogeneous reality through its multiplicity and subcultural divergence, despite overarching philosophy. Mexican Catholicism deviance from that of the papal ideal, for example, is typified in the folk figure of Santa Muerte (Chesnut, 2012), who seemingly combines the image of a virgin saint with pagan skeletal imagery of pre-Christian Mexican society. Furthermore, her worship and reverence is one often associated with crime and criminals, as well as the poor and disenfranchised (Chesnut, 2012). Syncretism at a subcultural level. Indeed, Christianity itself can be noted by its several different and sometimes conflicting schools of thought and multiple schisms, not least in the Protestant and Catholicism divide in Renaissance England. Likewise, Buddhism is another prime example. Its wide spread nature both global, and predominantly in East Asia, does not prescribe a singularity of thought. Beyond its two major branches, Mahayana and Theravada, its appearance in Japan is in tandem with the other dominant belief system: Shinto (Shimazono, 2005). Not only do both systems exist side by side, but there is a certain degree of hybridisation between them: individuals are not required to adhere to one exclusively, and many rites of passage are shared between the shrines of each (Shimazono, 2005: 1096). Birth and marriage rites might take place in a Shinto shrine for the same individuals as do death rites in a Buddhist temple. Singularity nor bastardisation is an inevitability of globalisation. In assessing the effects of globalisation on the world, one must not only take the theoretical into account — because of course, superficially should all cultures be receptive in exactitude, homogenisation would eventuate — but also, commodities and ideologies that have already and continue to be transmitted. Indeed, much of the Twentieth Century can be characterised by the very active stand-off between conflicting ideologies, independence versus imperialism, Liberalism versus Fascism, Capitalism versus Communism, Democracy versus Dictatorship. Conflicts and incursions attributable to active globalisation (Bisley, 2007: 208). As the dominant occupants of the Appauradai’s (1990) Finanscape and Ideoscape, respectively, Capitalism and Democracy stand as two foundations for contemporary thought, and contemporary life. Yet, despite radiation neither are uniform, taking various forms and systems. Democracy is of the people, of the individual. It enfranchises the disparate voices of people. Capitalism is of self-determination, and profit through means of production. Whilst their near ubiquity, as in the aforementioned case internet’s proliferation, seems to denote homogeneity. Yet fostering self-determination as one of key tenets: “argues passionately against instrumentalism or determinism, and for the recognition of the human as the bearer of universal rights” (Pollock et al., 2002: 5), and profit through trade as another, suggest otherwise. In fact, in regards to its main criticism of exploitation for financial gain taken as fact, how can the world be homogenising: “when global disorder, poverty and inequality are now at historic levels?” ask Held & McGrew (2002: 76). This damning rhetoric decrying the homogenisation of peoples, facilitate heterogeneity: for better or worse. Inextricably linked to Capitalism, and the commoditisation of the interdependent globalised world, Postmodernism proclaims that the ethnoscape is permeated and impacted by the mediascape in the current age of globalisation (Appadurai, 1990). Film is an agent of change, and commander of cultural fashion. Hollywood then, becomes a figurehead for the so-called Americanisation (Bisley, 2007: 163; Holton, 2005: 115) in its domination of the field. And yet, other world cinemas endure: not least in Britain, France and Japan, but also and the growing industries of Canada and Scandinavia. Even within the powerhouse of Hollywood capitalism can be seen to overrule homogenisation at times: the editing of content for certain audiences — notably the Chinese market — so as not to infringe upon cultural values, cause of offence or merely to avoid confusion. These in term augment profits. Postmodernism furthermore places great emphasis on Liberalism and self-determination: cornerstones of the cosmopolitan lifestyle marked by “multiple identities and lifestyles” (Brown, 2006: 134). Indeed, since the advent of mass media fashions have been easily disseminated. Fascinations with the exoticism and antiquity born out of Napoleonic conquests and the birth of archaeology were commoditised by the media: admired and appropriated. Egyptian, Mayan and Mesopotamian antiquity in the formulation of the Art Deco style. “Cultural capital does not exist in a social vacuum… forces that ground its circulation and tie it very much to local passions and loyalties” (Bridge et al., 2006: 59). Again, globalised ideas are deconstructed from their original purpose and meaning and reapplied to the appropriating culture’s needs, values and intentions. Fashions arose in the colonial countries on the world stage based on the acquisition and display of such antiquities and technologies. The Great Exhibition for example, or the successive World’s Fairs, created a fascination with the mystique of exoticism. The publicity augmenting its reach, and accessibility to all. ‘Global Culture as Cultural Imperialism’ (Tomlinson, 1999: 79) was born, and so the cosmopolitan identity: one that seeks to exude the impression of exoticism and expedition, through transference. The global flows of ideas, ideologies, technologies and commodities in the current age is uniquely multilateral, and democratic. The speed at which they are conveyed through the omnipresent mass media that pervades society enables multilateralism to form a fluid impressionistic ethnoscape. The self-determinism and liberalism conveyed by reigning globalised ideologies, likewise, promotes the formulation of Cosmopolitan identities: “humanist discourse of rights founded on the unique and inviolable presence of ‘human’ personhood” (Pollock et al., 2002: 5). The trend towards such individualism, seen both at the societal and personal level, uses the philosophy of self-determinism in the accumulation of knowledge, awareness and cultural capital as commodity. In turn, through sheer profuseness of disparate cultural and subcultural identities — multilayered and hybridised — proliferates the cycle and ensures that no single culture or aspect, through imperialism, isolation or influential immensity, can achieve an overpowering osmosis of cultural superiority. This combination in multitude of individualism and cosmopolitan fluidity of thought, exchange and movement precludes the melting pot ever truly forming one singular, global alloy of homogeneity.

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Work history

Media Planner / Buyer
Oct 2016Aldwych, London, UKFull Time
I joined the7stars media agency in October 2016 in a role that combines the disciplines of Media Planning and Buying as well as client facing duties in Account Management, working in the team that looks after Suzuki, Johnston Press (The i Newspaper), Current Account Switch Service, Hoseasons, and LateRooms. As part of the internal creative project team, I make use of my prior experience with the writing, Final Cut and the Adobe Creative Suite for a range of internal and external communications including video content, campaign visualisations and both creative and data driven media responses for new business and client pitches. As part of the Week of the Stars project team, I produce external video creative the agency – rounding up the working week, campaigns and fun parties, activities and adventures the7stars team has been involved in personally and professionally. As part of the What's Hot project team, I help co-ordinate and produce monthly editorial for PR and industry commentary.
Curator, Organiser and Creative
Jan 2013Freelance
Organisation of the annual event, as a key member of a team. Lead responsibilities include sourcing and selection of the investigative documentaries for screening. As well as reaching out to the filmmakers and other panelists to schedule their participation in the event. Assisting the Centre for Investigative Journalism with the smooth running and operation at City University London: working both technically to ensure the successful presentation of the films and panel discussions, as well as minding the filmmakers, panel members and guests before, during and after the events.

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Skills

• Advertising
• Events
• Marketing PR
• Art Direction
• Editorial
• Creative Direction
• Excel
• Illustrator
• Indesign
• Photoshop
• Photography
• Graphic Design
• Creative Writing
• Academic Writing
• Copywrighting
• Video Editing
• Account Management
• Comms Planning

Education

BA Film and Anthropology with a Proficiency in Japanese
Sep 2013 - Jun 2015
This uniquely tailored programme of seemingly disparate yet complementary majors and minors has given me access to a wider selection of interesting modules allowing me to further embrace my multi-disciplinary interests and intense work ethic. Consideration of literature and fine art in multidisciplinary English/Film modules has helped to further widen my purview and critical discussion, contextualising Film as part of an older narrative tradition, embedded in and forged from culture, both at the hands of the filmmakers, through appropriation and in the eye of the viewer. I studied Urban Anthropology, Diaspora and Childhood specifically to consider themes in creative media, investigating cross-cultural concerns present in the fabric of societal consciousness. • Living Cities: Migration and Identity Politics • Cinescapes: Time, Space and Identity • Current Debates in Anthropology? • Ethnography ?• Egyptian Style: Ancient Egyptian Art? • Intermediate Japanese I & II • Diasporic Cinemas • Cultures of Race, Ethnicity and Racism • Social Philosophy • Cityscapes in Literature and Film? • Childhood ?• Independent Study Dissertation
Super 8 Film, Shooting, Editing and Processing; Experimental Enthnography
Sep 2012 - Oct 2012
• Super 8 Film Shooting, Editing and Processing • Black & White Super 8 Film Processing • 16mm Toning & Tinting • Experimental Enthnography

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Awards

BA Film and Anthropology with a proficiency in Japanese
This uniquely tailored programme of seemingly disparate yet complementary majors and minors has given me access to a wider selection of interesting modules allowing me to further embrace my multi-disciplinary interests and intense work ethic. Consideration of literature and fine art in multidisciplinary English/Film modules has helped to further widen my purview and critical discussion, contextualising Film as part of an older narrative tradition, embedded in and forged from culture, both at the hands of the filmmakers, through appropriation and in the eye of the viewer. I studied Urban Anthropology, Diaspora and Childhood specifically to consider themes in creative media, investigating cross-cultural concerns present in the fabric of societal consciousness.